Abstract-Knowledge exchange and information access in a truly distributed network often require transmitting of data through an open media. Consequently, data presented through such an environment are vulnerable to attacks. To minimize such vulnerability, data transformation or encryptionldecryption techniques are often utilized among senders and receivers to achieve secure communication. Since data encryption/decryption requires sharing of a secret session key, finding an efficient way to distribute the session key in a large-scale, truly distributed network has been a nontrivial task. This paper presents a protocol for efficiently distributing session keys in such an environment to establish a secure channel. We assume the target network consists of many locally trusted centers, and each center has many users attached to it. The scheme incorporates the public-key distribution concept and the RSA encryption scheme as the basic mathematical tools, but eliminates the storage problem associated with huge public-key files. In addition, the proposed scheme has the added feature of providing the authenticate session key to the two parties in a secure communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
With rapid growth of modem technology, more and more people rely on computer networks to exchange knowledge, access information, and process data in a distributed environment. One major drawback of transmitting data through such an environment is that it opens more security holes to intruders and wiretappers. To meet the demand of people who seek secret communications, various kinds of data transformation, or encryption/decryption techniques, have been developed such that the data through open media become meaningless to intruders, but the original text can be recovered when data reach the destination. The encryptionldecryption performed between the sender and the receiver requires to share a secret session key between these two parties. Traditionally, private couriers were utilized to distribute the secret session key. This approach was also used when a group of users were involved in a private conference. But with the explosion of secret communications over a distributed network environment, this approach has been rendered obsolete.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [l] introduced the concept of the public-key distribution system, which provides a realistic altemative to the traditional approach. One of the problems arising with this approach is that unauthorized users may attempt tampering with the public keys stored in the public-key file. To solve this problem, key authentication schemes are proposed to be added in conjunc- tion with Diffie and Hellman's scheme to make their key distribution scheme fully secure. Two such schemes are the public-key distribution with certificate [2] and the public-key distribution with tree authentication [3] . Both of these schemes, however, being centralized approaches, have the weakness that they too require the maintenance of a large public-key file. Considering the case of a large and distributed environment with millions of users, managing a centralized file with that many entries clearly is impractical [4] . In 1984, Shamir [5] proposed the new idea of an identity-based cryptosystem for distribution of session keys. Since then, many algorithms [6]-[ 101 have been proposed to implement this identitybased cryptographic approach. However, the security of these algorithms is still being tested by the cryptographic community. There are some other methods for distributing secret session keys to network users using a centralized key generation and key distribution approach [ l I , 121. These schemes have three major drawbacks in common: l ) a large key file needs be maintained at the key center, 2) the centralized key center is the focus of cryptanalytic attack, and 3) since all key generation and distribution go through this center, traffic congestion between the key center and other nodes in the distributed network could be severe.
Other efforts have been made towards finding more suitable solutions to the user's authentication problem in a large-scale network. One scheme proposed in 1986 by Birrell et al. [4] assumes the existence of a hierarchical global tree-structured name service in the network. Each principal (principals could be people, machines, organizations, printers, databases, file systems, etc.) must register into this name service at a directory, and all directories maintain a fixed logical relationship to all other directories in a tree hierarchy. When principle i is registered under directory j , directory j becomes the parent of principal i, and a secret key K, is shared by these two entities. Each directory shares a secret key with its parent directory (if any) and with each directory that is its child in the directory tree hierarchy. Thus, a secret session key transmitted from principle i to principle k is first passed to directory j , and then, using a relative name path through a sequence of directories, to principle k's directory and so to principle k. The problem associated with this method is that a secure communication channel between principle i and principle k needs to be established via some indirect trusted intermediate name service directories.
Thus, the shared key between i and k is also exposed to all these intermediate directories.
The communication protocol that we are going to present in this paper incorporates the public-key distribution concept [ 11 and the RSA public-key encryption scheme [ 131 as the basic mathematical tools, and is suitable for a large-scale distributed network. Any number of network users (or principals) can be added onto or deleted from the network freely without affecting the performance of this scheme. Even though public-key concepts are utilized, there is no need for each user to keep a copy of the global public-key file. We assume that the network is distributed in the sense that there does not exist a globally trusted key distribution center (KDC) or authentication center. However, we assume that the network consists of many local centers, and all network users must register under one of these centers. These local centers are trusted in the sense that they are expected to handle requests from their users exactly according to the proposed protocol, and they have no ability to interpret secret conversations carried out among different users of the system. Section I1 gives a detailed description of our scheme; Section 111 presents the security analysis of our scheme and discusses its advantages and tradeoffs; Section IV is the conclusion.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Our proposed scheme requires a large-scale distributed network service consisting of many local centers, each local center having several or many users attached to it, as shown in Fig. 1 . The network service may be in a computer network system, consisting of many hosts and users attached to hosts, or in a telephone system, consisting of many switching centers, and telephones attached to the centers, or in a networked banking association, consisting of many headquarters, and banks attached to headquarters, etc. Any user who wants to access the network service must register under one of the local centers (LC) when first joining the network, providing to LC some personal information. Each LC must follow certain procedures and protocols in order to make this scheme work.
A. Initialization
Each LC, (local center i) needs to select two distinct large primes p l and ql, and calculate 
The two values d, and IZ, are recorded onto a verification 
2)
Register under some LC. Registration is similar to applying for a credit card or having a new telephone line installed; it may involve verification of the user's identity and the checking of the user's references. More specifically, if U, wants to register under LC,, then the registration procedure should include the following steps. a) U, submits hidher name, public key Y,, and some personal information such as social security number, hair and eye colors, etc., to LC,. b) After verifying the correctness of the submitted information, LC, appends its own ID, IDLc,, to the user's supplied information, and makes a new personal ID, ID,, for U,. In other words, this new ID, is formed by concatenating several segments of data, and each segment contains specific information such as U,'s name, U,'s SSN, Y,, IDLC,, etc. c) LC, calculates S, = &(ID,) and issues both S, and ID, to U,. Since both S, and ID, are large integers, it is difficult for U, to memorize them. S, and ID, will need to be entered into the system from a physically interconnected point to the network each time that U, wants to authenticate himself/herself to a remote entity. T o type in large, hard-to-memorize character strings may not be a very pleasant experience. Thus, we recommend the use of some local storage device, e.g., a PC diskette or magnetic card or smart card. In other words, at registration time, the values of S, and ID, should be recorded onto such a device and then issued to U,.
B. Authentication
Suppose U, in Fig. 1, attached to LC,, wants to create a secure channel (to share a secret session key) with U, attached to LC2.
The authentication procedure works as follows:
U; sends Si, ID, as plaintext through the network to U,.
Upon receiving S, and ID,, U, extracts IDLc, from ID,. Next ID," = Dd, (SJ.
If ID," = ID;, the authentication procedure will continue; otherwise, the procedure is terminated.
It is to be noted that users of the network need to be able to identify each other by user name and to access local center public keys from the local center to which they are attached. Of course, a user U, could submit the other user's name Uj to a name server and obtain, from the name server, along with the network address of user cl,, the public keys for the local center to which U, is at- 
where XI is the secret information known only to U, and N is a publicly available large prime chosen by the global service. This computed KG is the secret session key that will be shared by U, and Uj for establishing a secure channel.
In order to verify that U, has successfully obtained the same Kjj, and to avoid playback attack from a third party, U, could use KG to encrypt a small paragraph of text which contains a time stamp of current time and a sentence, such as C = EKu("I am U, want to talk to U,, current time") and sends this ciphertext to U,. U, can extract Y, from ID,, computes K,, = YF mod N where X, is the secret information known only to U,, and then uses K,, to decrypt the ciphertext to D K q ( C ) = "I am U,, want to talk to U,, current time" to thus verify the correctness of K,,. If the decrypted sentence is correct, then a secure channel has been successfully established between U, and U,.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
There are four possible attacks that we need to discuss in this section. They are the following.
(Attack I): If an imposter wants to pretend to be U, and establish a "secret channel" with U,, then he/she can take the following approach. Since a and N are publicly known information. select a random number X ' and generate the corresponding Y' according to the equation Y' = a x ' mod N .
Because Si and ID, are transmitted in plaintext form, and can be intercepted by wiretappers, the imposter can intercept them, replace Y, in ID, by Y' to obtain ID,!, and then send S, and ID,' to U,. But, upon receiving Si and MI,', U, first verifies whether S, and ID, are correct by computing and comparing the received ID: with the computed ID,". Since ID,' is different from ID,", the comparison fails, and the request to establish a "secret channel" between the imposter and U, is rejected. Thus, this attack fails.
(Attack 2): An imposter may modify ID, to ID,! in exactly the same way as in (Attack 1) above, and also modify S, to S,' such that ID,' = Dd, (S;). If so, the comparison between ID,' and ID," will succeed. However, since S, is calculated from the equation and e, is known to LC, only, computing S,' from ID,' would be extremely difficult without knowledge of e,.
(Attack 3): Since S, and ID, can be intercepted by an intruder during transmission, people other than U, who have obtained S, and ID, can also send these two values to someone else, claiming to be U,. However, since they lack knowledge of the personal secret key X I , they still cannot obtain the correct session key.
(Attack 4): If an imposter wants to pretend to be U,, and attempts to establish a "secret channel" with U,, he/she could intercept not only Si and ID,, but also the encrypted paragraph &,,(''I am U,, want to talk to U , , current time") and play it back whenever he/she chooses. But because of the time stamp associated with the ciphertext and the lack of knowledge of K,,, the ciphertext containing a correct time cannot be calculated correctly by the imposter, thus this attack will fail.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A new, authenticated public-key distribution scheme for a distributed computer network is proposed. We believe that this scheme has the following merits.
1) The shared, secret key can be authenticated by both users and be distributed successfully without the help of a globally trusted centralized KDC. This is advantageous because: a) for a truly distributed, large-scale network, such a KDC may not exist, and b) the security of a centralized key distribution scheme totally depends on the security of the centralized KDC; compromise of the KDC endangers all network security [3].
2) Even though the proposed scheme utilizes public-key cryptography as the basic mathematical tool, it effectively eliminates the large public-key file management problem. There is no need for each network user to keep a copy of the global public-key file. Instead, each individual local center needs to keep a public-key file for all local centers for authentication purposes. We also require a user registration process and encourage the use of a local storage device.
3) A "secure channel" is said to be established between users A and B if these two users have successfully obtained the common secret session key. With our scheme, such a key can be obtained only by A and B (thus not exposing it to other users or to local centers). We believe this feature is more advantageous compared with Birrell's scheme in which this secret key is also exposed to certain intermediate trusted directories.
4) Similar to Simmon's scheme [14], in our scheme, each user holds a secret number, and this number is never transmitted directly through the network. Not even the local center has any knowledge of this number. Thus, the probability of having it exposed is kept to a minimum. 5 ) With this scheme, users can be added onto or deleted from the network freely without degrading the performance of the scheme. Only when there is a new local center added onto or an old local center withdrawn from the network must some update work be done. For example, when a new LC is created in the network, all local center verification tables need to be updated; this can be accomplished by broadcasting the public key of this new LC to all the other LC's. Finding an efficient way for authenticated key distribution in a large-scale, truly distributed network is a difficult task. Our proposed scheme is one of many efforts towards finding a possible solution. W e hope to see more constructive work in this field in the near future.
